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English transcript
classification. And so to the extent that you
have an individual who says what is happening
in this law is that it is treating someone who
is transgender but who does not have, because
of the medical interventions and the things
that has have been done, who does not have the
same threat to physical competition and safety
and all of the reasons that the state puts forward.
That's actually a different class, says this
individual. So you're not treating the class
the same and you're not... how do you respond
to that?
In other words, the as-applied challenge essentially
redefines the class or one could think of it
as that. And so what's wrong with that, number
one, and how do you square that with our holdings
in Caban, which Lehr later described in this
way. In other words, Lehr suggested that Caban
was establishing that as-applied challenges
of this nature do exist. Certainly the... take
the second question first. Caban says nothing
about as-applied. I know that Lehr says later
this was an as-applied case. But simply reading
Caban, it does not say that. It simply applies
intermediate... No, I understand, but that...
those two cases were in juxtaposition with one
another and Lehr comes out the way it does distinguishing
Caban on the basis that it's an as-applied challenge
and we in Lehr have a facial challenge. And
it's basically the same facts. So if those...
if you're right, that... those two cases can't
come out the way they do. I don't think so,
Your Honor. Again, Lehr was actually briefed
as a standing argument of maybe you might be
able to argue that this law is overbroad, but
you individually are not in the overbroad part
and therefore you don't get to challenge it.
The Court didn't use standing language, like
express standing language in the opinion, but
that is the logic of the opinion. Mr. Hurst,
there's another way to think about the case
your friends on the other side posit and that
is that...
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