Transcript · English
English transcript
It's worked in Japan, it's worked in Korea,
you did the deal with Europe, you did the deal
with the UK. What's sort of out there that's
still there?
I think India's kind of still out there, although
it seems like they're capitulating a little
bit. I saw that they just bought a lot of liquefied
petroleum gas from the United States in November.
What are the big sort of hot button places that
you want to... I'll tell you a story about India.
So, um, if you remember... So I did the first
deal, the UK deal. And we told the UK that they
had to get it done by two Fridays from now.
That that was the date. That the train was going
to leave the station by two Fridays... ...because
I have a lot of other countries doing things
and, you know, if someone else is first, they're
first. And President Trump does deals like a
staircase. First stair gets the best deal. You
can't get the best deal after the first guy
went. Everyone says, "I want the UK deal, I
want the UK deal." The answer is, No, they were
first. They took the chance, they moved quickest,
they're first. Second, up a stair. So that sets
the floor. Right. And then the next one's got
to be higher. And then the next one higher,
and then the next one higher, and the next one
higher. So he does things that way because that
way it incents you to come to the table. To
act quickly. Right. Right?
You could have three countries who are the second
deal, if they all get done at the same time.
Right. But you, you know, if you want to wait
and see how it goes, that's at your risk. So,
he does the UK deal. And they had to get it
done by Friday. And Thursday afternoon, Keir
Starmer is on the phone, the President. We have,
they do their deal, Wednesday night, and on
Thursday we have a press conference and we announce
it. Okay. So everybody asked the President,
"Who do you think is next?" And if you look
back at that time, he said, he talks about a
variety of countries but he names India a couple
of times. Publicly. It's not, it's not like
a big secret. And we were talking to India.
And we told India, "You had three Fridays."
You put 'em on a shot clock. Well, they have
to get it done because what happens is I have
lots of other countries... ...and when those
other countries do their deal... The staircase
goes up. Right. And... Yeah. Now, the President,
during all these deals, he would refer to me
as the greatest table setter who ever lived.
Okay?
Because you've never had anybody who was as
successful as me as a businessman before...
...who's just the table setter, basically. You
know, so, 'cause what I would do is I would
negotiate the contracts... ...and set the whole
deal up. But let's be clear. It's his deal.
Yeah. Okay?
He's the closer. He does the deal. So I said,
"You gotta have Modi. It's all set up. You have
to have Modi call the President." And they were
uncomfortable doing it. So Modi didn't call.
Wow. So that Friday left. In the middle of the
next week, we did Indonesia, the Philippines,
right?
Vietnam. We announced a whole bunch of deals.
Malaysia, in that period. So, we did these whole
bunch of deals, so that's like... That staircase.
And because we negotiated them and assumed India
was going to be done before them... I had negotiated
them at a higher rate. So now the problem is,
the deals came out at a higher rate. Right.
And then India calls back and says, "Oh, okay,
we're, we're ready." I said, "Ready for what?"
You know, it was like three weeks later. I go,
"Are you ready for the train that left the station
three weeks ago?" So, what happened is they
just, you know, there's sometimes there's that
seesaw... ...and people are on just the wrong
side of the seesaw. You know, when I was a,
when I was a young, uh... ...when I was young
in business and I was a trader... ...so one
of my first jobs was as a trader. And when I
would start on the wrong side of the seesaw...
...you know, I'd buy and it would go down. And
then I'd sell and it would go up. And then I'd
buy and it would go down and sell... Like, when
you're on the right side of the seesaw... ...you
can't lose. You know, you buy, it goes up. And
then you sell and it goes down. And you buy,
it goes up, and sell, it goes down. And you
feel like you're the king. But when you're on
the wrong side of the seesaw, what I used to
do... ...is I used to put the phone down. I
used to go in the bathroom... ...fill a bucket
with water, take a rag, and I would wash the
plants in the office. 'Cause it was much cheaper
than me picking up the phone. So, and then,
and then people would call and say, you know,
"Can I speak to Howard?" And they go, "No, he's
in a meeting." And meanwhile they'd look up
and there I am washing the plants. 'Cause whatever
I did, I would get back in there and I'd touch
it, and it would go the wrong way. So what happened
is, India just was, you know, on the wrong side
of the seesaw. And it wasn't... it was just
they couldn't get it done when they needed to.
And then they couldn't get it done. And then
they couldn't get it done. And then they couldn't
get it done. And so what happened is all these
other countries kept doing deals... ...and they're
just further in the back of the line. And now
when they say, "But, but what I want..." "...is
I want the deal in between the UK and Vietnam..."
"...because that's what I negotiated." Right.
And they, and they remember. And I remember.
And they say, "But, but you agreed!" And I said,
"Then." Then. Not now. Then. And so that's,
that's the problem. India will work it out.
But it's just, you know, there's a lot of countries...
...and, and they each have their own deep internal
politics. And to get something approved by their
parliament or their diet or their... ...you
know, these are deeply complex things. And,
and we're dealing with the world. But we've
gotten them done. You know, we got Europe done,
right?
We did Japan, then we did Europe... ...then
we did Korea. And, and we've done country after
country after country. And, uh, and these are
durable. Meaning, these are deals... ...that
take care of the countries' autos, pharmaceuticals...
...semiconductors, you know, things that really
matter.
End of transcript · 1,172 words · machine translated