Israel's Military Strategy in Syria

A wounded country stands at the heart of the Middle East. And now, its future is being shaped not only in Damascus, but also in Tel Aviv. The question is simple. What does Israel really want from Syria? سوريا لن تكون منصة لتهديد دول مجاورة، بما في ذلك إسرائيل.

هل فعل النسائل لديها مخاوف أمنية أم لديها أطمعة توسعية؟ لسنوات، قالت إسرائيل أن مهامها الرئيسية كانت الأمان إيران، الهزبالة، المسلسلين، والقوات الضحية قريباً من الجولان ولكن بعد إسقاط بشار الإسعاد في ديسمبر 2024 لم يطلق سوريا حرب ضد إسرائيل

قالت مهامها الرئيسية أنها لم ترغب بمعاناة جديدة وأن البلد بحاجة إلى تبديل ومستقبل As we promised in the past to liberate it, it is now our duty to build and develop it. Israel responded differently.

Within days, Israeli jets struck hundreds of targets across Syria. The Israeli military said it had struck most of Syria's strategic weapons stockpiles, including air defense systems, missiles, aircraft, naval assets, and weapons depots. Israeli reports said as much as 70 to 80 percent of Syria's strategic military capabilities were destroyed. Israel said this was to prevent dangerous weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

But the result was clear. Syria's army was not just weakened. It was pushed back by years. Then came the ground moves. Israeli forces entered the UN-monitored buffer zone near the occupied Golan Heights, despite

the 1974 disengagement agreement. Under that agreement, the buffer zone was meant to separate Israeli and Syrian forces, with UNDOF as the military force supervising the area. The United Nations said Israel's entry violated the agreement. hold their obligations under this instrument.

Israel called it temporary. But Israeli officials later said their forces would remain in key areas for an indefinite period. Beyond the main military positions, there were repeated local incursions.

Rights monitors later recorded hundreds of Israeli ground incursions in southern Syria, with one estimate putting the number at around 620 between December 2024 and February 2026. In Quneitra, Daraa, and parts of the Damascus countryside,

local reports described Israeli patrols entering villages, setting up temporary checkpoints, searching homes, detaining civilians. and firing on residents in several incidents. Syrian media also reported cases where Israeli forces used smoke and gas canisters against civilians,

including women and children in rural Quneitra. These were smaller incidents than the air campaign, but they showed how southern Syria was becoming a constant pressure zone, not only for the state, but also for the people living near the front line. Then came the political demands.

In February 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would not allow the new Syrian army to enter the area south of Damascus. He demanded the full demilitarization of Quneitra, Deraa, and Sueda. In practice, this would mean that large parts of southern Syria would remain outside Syrian state control. At the same time, Israel presented itself as a protector of Syria's Druze minority.

After clashes in Sueda between local Druze factions and Bedouin tribal groups, Damascus sent military and security forces, saying it aimed to restore order and bring the province back under state authority. Israel responded by striking Syrian forces near Sueda and warning Damascus not to deploy there.

The cost was also heavy for Damascus. A UN commission report said at least 225 government, military and security personnel were reported killed during the July 2025 violence, many of them in mid-July Israeli airstrikes. For Damascus, this was not just a security warning. It looked like an attempt to turn Syria's internal divisions into a permanent Israeli

security tool. And according to Reuters, Israel lobbied Washington to keep Syria weak and decentralized. At a time when Damascus was seeking sanctions relief and wider international recognition. For Israel, a Syrian state closely aligned with Turkey could create a new regional bloc on its northern front.

A united Syria with a rebuilt army, restored borders, and strategic links to Turkey, Jordan, and the Gulf would change the regional balance. A weak Syria, divided internally and restricted militarily, gives Israel strategic depth without needing a peace

agreement. Even the Golan Heights tells the same story. After Assad's fall, Israel approved plans to increase the number of Israeli settlers in the occupied Golan Heights.

Syrian territory captured in 1967 and annexed in 1981, a move rejected by most of the international community. So while regional powers discuss reconstruction, trade corridors, and railways linking Syria back to the region, Israel is focused on something else. No Syrian military recovery.

No strong central state in the south. No pressure over the Golan. And no strategic comeback for Damascus. This is why Syria's future is not only a question of rebuilding roads, railways, and It is also a question of sovereignty.

Because for Israel, the safety of the people is paramount. If a Syria may not be a peaceful Syria, it may be a Syria kept too weak to matter.