Iran's Regional Security Policy Shift

The first clause of the agreement shows that the Islamic Republic probably has

realized its limitations regarding the Levant- centric security order at present.

I think it will move toward a Persian Gulf- centric security order…

and take steps. Why? Because, actually, its advantage lies here.

That is, just as these security and military equations in the Persian Gulf,

anyway, led to the end of the war and led to Iran imposing a series of military,

security, and political rules in the region, it can turn this steering

wheel toward the Persian Gulf. Now, how correct this is and what threats and

opportunities it has must be discussed. But the first clause in the agreement,

in my opinion, is a shift in Iran's regional policies. I still have doubts about

whether we are moving from a security- oriented regional

order based on the Levant to an order based on economy and development in the

Persian Gulf. I don't know. This text shows that

the Islamic Republic wants to bring back the previous order in a new form.

Its concern is still security. For now. It says," Look, Hezbollah is there,

and I've seized the Strait of Hormuz. If you touch Hezbollah,

I'll close the Strait."

No, I'm not saying it's not security- oriented.

I'm saying that now the advantages of the Islamic Republic's regional policy and

its regional leverage have shifted toward the Persian Gulf, and the focus

now will... Yes, that's a valid point.

I still say that I see this focus as security- related.

Meaning, the Islamic Republic says," Look, in the Levant,

where I had Iraq and the Axis of Resistance,

now I've also added the Strait of Hormuz to it." I will connect these to revive the

previous order in some way. To say,' Look, you must commit'— which is also

mentioned in this—' to put regime change aside.'

Now, what will happen after this regime change is a matter of debate.

If the world is moving towards China, does this agreement mean Iran's return to the

American order?

That's a very important question.

And where does China stand in this?

It's clear that our friends did not accept the requirements of a global order

heading towards anarchy, which requires

us to create ambiguity in the nuclear field,

so they went and signed two clauses. Because of the bombing of our nuclear

facilities, legally, we could have invoked Article 10. We were negotiating,

nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision were bombed,

we were threatened with nuclear weapons— pay attention to this.

Trump explicitly threatened us with nuclear weapons.

We moved ourselves from a position of positive exception to a position

of negative exception. To turn us into the only country that cannot invoke Article

10 of the NPT,

because it wants to sign another Chapter VII resolution in which it has

committed to never build nuclear weapons, with no way out.

Look, what Lavrov says about the assassination of the Leader,

as the holder of the fatwa banning nuclear weapons, makes sense.

He says that as long as Mr. Khamenei was alive,

there was a fatwa banning nuclear weapons, around which the Iranian elites

were united. After the US attack and his assassination, I wouldn't be surprised if

some Iranian elites have changed their view on Iran not pursuing nuclear weapons.

He says Gaddafi came and gave up his nuclear program, they pounced on him,

killed him, and it was broadcast live while Clinton clapped in front of the TV.

Then he says, on the other hand,

we have the example of North Korea,

which went and built a nuclear bomb,

and now no one bothers them anymore. This is what it means: Moscow has changed

its stance on Iran's nuclear weapons from a red light to a yellow light.

It doesn't say," I agree," it says," it is open to discussion." Therefore, at

least from Moscow's side, Now,

I can't give a definitive opinion to say that Beijing coordinates

many of its positions with Moscow regarding issues of global peace and security.

We strongly urged these gentlemen,'

Look, go to China and Russia during the negotiations,

if you don't want to change your nuclear line, hold strategic talks,

including on changing the nuclear doctrine.'

But these gentlemen dug their heels in, saying,' It's impossible,

we can't,' and so on… We've heard all

this before.