Transcript · Persian → English
Analysis of US-Iran Conflict Dynamics
If you had told me a year ago that the US would attack Iran
the US would attack Iran with Israel,
with Israel, gain full air superiority, and the regional countries would not join
and the regional countries would not
that war more aggressively, more enthusiastically, I think a lot
more enthusiastically,
of experts a year ago would have been very surprised that
of experts a year ago would have been very surprised that
We are more likely to get regional countries on board with a kind of modest
with a kind of modest vision
vision of regional
as a way of moving towards that kind of larger cooperation
larger cooperation than we are to ask regional states to accept a new fundamental
to accept a new fundamental security reality.
It's fundamental to
is that any form of interdependence can be both
for a positive outcome or the basis of adding pressure or coercion.
or the basis of adding pressure or coercion.
And Iran just has to be comfortable with that, strategically.
The strait has not been closed to pressure Arab countries at this moment.
It has been closed as part of the Iran- US war.
Just as the Bab- el- Mandeb Strait was not closed to pressure Arab countries,
but was closed as an effort to lift the blockade on Yemen.
Now, between Iran and the US,
Which one wants this war to reach a state of' no war,
The Iranian side or the American side?
Meaning, the Iranian side says,'
I have kept my reserves,'
' I have preserved my sovereignty and my territorial integrity,' '
if you press the stop button, I am satisfied.'
The American side, well, is not satisfied.
You are forced to put
pressure on the opposing side because you know they are sensitive to interest rates,
because you know they are sensitive to inflation,
Because you know he faces a serious question in the midterms, and in the Senate,
things are getting worse for him And very clearly,
در جاهای دیگه مرتبطه با قیمت بنزینه و چیزهایی شبیه به این.
To believe that that's going to make a difference is to believe that at some point
is to believe that at some point
the marginal pressure gets so great that the political decision in Washington has
that the political decision in Washington has to change where this president,
you know, decides that the pain is intolerable and the war has to end.
Maybe it's the
but that's a big gamble.
Most of the actions Iran can take, even striking major facilities like Ras Laffan,
even striking major facilities like Ras Laffan,
the LNG plant in Qatar, this is a question of marginal pressure.
this is a question of marginal pressure.
Iran is not experiencing marginal costs.
Iran cannot come up with enough military capabilities or a military
strategy that ends up controlling decisions in Washington.
controlling decisions in Washington.
But it can use a combination of its military response to US aggression and
its diplomatic outreach, including through regional countries...
its diplomatic outreach, including through regional countries...
Do you think the Qataris didn't want to give us our money during Biden's time?
They wanted to give it.
The Prime Minister of Qatar directly made one of the
officials of the Central Bank of Qatar responsible for following up on this matter,
and that's where they told Mr. Farzin that even if they don't pay,
the Emir himself will provide the credit. What do you think happened?
At the direct behest of the Americans, that official at the
At the direct behest of the Americans, that official at the
Central Bank of Qatar was fired.
We shouldn't exaggerate the other side's ability to influence.
Actually, regarding Qatar,
and the risk of weakening it faces regarding the UAE and Saudi Arabia,
more than anyone else, meaning the Saudis might see some benefit in this matter.
Up until the Bab- el- Mandeb incident.
The Emiratis might think differently about their security relations with Israel.
The Qataris get hit by both us and the Israelis.
At least one site was hit twice,
Look, there are limits to their power.
Look, there are limits to their power.
Right now, the Americans are blocking any regional deal.
Until they wake up and realize that there is no going back to before the war and
و متوجه بشن که به قبل از جنگ و به قبل از ۹ اسفند نمیشه برگشت،
before February 28th, we still have some way to go.
End of transcript · 749 words · machine translated
Original transcript (Persian)
If you had told me a year ago that the US would attack Iran with Israel, gain full air superiority, and the regional countries would not join that war more aggressively,
more enthusiastically, I think a lot of experts a year ago would have been very surprised that things have played out this way. We are more likely to get regional countries on board with a kind of modest vision
of regional administration of the Strait of Hormuz as a way of moving towards that kind of larger cooperation than we are to ask regional states to accept a new fundamental security reality. It's fundamental to the idea of interdependence
is that any form of interdependence can be both platform for a positive outcome or the basis of adding pressure or coercion. And Iran just has to be comfortable with that, strategically. تنگه بابت فشار به کشورهای عربی بسته نشده در این لحظه.
بابت بخشی از جنگ ایران و آمریکا بسته شده. چنانکه تنگه بابالمندب هم بابت بخشی از فشار بر کشورهای عربی بسته نشده، بابت تلاش برای خروج یمن از محاصره بسته شده. الان شما ایران و آمریکا، کدومشون دوست دارن زودتر این جنگ تموم شه؟ کدومشون دوست دارن این جنگ به نقطه نه جنگ نه صلح برسه در لحظه فعلی؟
طرف ایرانی یا طرف آمریکایی؟ خب واضح طرف ایرانی. یعنی طرف ایرانی میگه خب من تا اینجا اهداف طرف مقابل حاکم نشده، ذخایر رو نگه داشتم، حاکمیتم رو حفظ کردم، تمامیت ارضیم رو حفظ کردم، دکمه استپ بزنی من راضیم.
طرف آمریکایی خب راضی نیست. شما ناچارید به طرف مقابل فشار بیارید چون میدونید اون به نرخ بهره حساسه، چون میدونید به تورم حساسه، چون میدونید که او سوال جدی در میاندوره داره و در سنا وضعیت داره بدتر میشه براش
و خیلی واضح تغییرات در آیووا در جاهای دیگه مرتبطه با قیمت بنزینه و چیزهایی شبیه به این. To believe that that's going to make a difference is to believe that at some point the marginal pressure gets so great
that the political decision in Washington has to change where this president, you know, decides that the pain is intolerable and the war has to end. Maybe it's the case that that point is coming in one month's time or two months' time, but that's a big gamble. Most of the actions Iran can take,
even striking major facilities like Ras Laffan, the LNG plant in Qatar, this is a question of marginal pressure. Iran is not experiencing marginal costs. Iran cannot come up with enough military capabilities
or a military strategy that ends up controlling decisions in Washington. But it can use a combination of its military response to US aggression and its diplomatic outreach, including through regional countries...
فکر میکنید قطریها زمان بایدن پول ما رو نمیخواستن بدن؟ میخواستن بدن. مستقیما نخستوزیر قطر یکی از مقامات بانک مرکزی قطر رو مسئول پیگیری این موضوع کرد و همونجا هم هستش که به آقای فرزین میگن به اینکه
ما اگر اونها هم ندادن خود امیر اعتبار میده. فکر میکنید چه اتفاقی افتاد؟ با اشاره مستقیم آمریکاییها اون مسئول در بانک مرکزی قطر اخراج شد. ما نباید درباره توانایی تاثیرگذاری طرف مقابل اغراق بکنیم.
اتفاقا من درباره قطر فکر میکنم با توجه به مجموع اتفاقاتی که براش افتاده و ریسک تضعیفی که درباره امارات و عربستان داره بیش از هر کسی، یعنی عربستانیها ممکنه در این موضوع نفعی ببینن تا قبل از واقعه بابالمندب. اماراتیها ممکنه نوع دیگری در روابط امنیتی خودشون با اسرائیل فکر میکنن. قطریها این نیستند.
قطریها هم از ما میخورن، هم از اسرائیلیها میخورن. حداقل یک سایت دوبار یکبار توسط اسرائیلیها یکبار توسط ایرانیها انجام شد. نمیتونه کاری بکنه. ببینید حدود زور اینها محدودیت داره. الان آمریکاییها جلوی هر معامله منطقهای رو میگیرن.
هنوز تا وقتی اونها بیدار بشن و متوجه بشن که به قبل از جنگ و به قبل از ۹ اسفند نمیشه برگشت، کمی فاصله داریم.