Concerns Over Electronic Voting Security

The video I'm about to show you was censored by the TSE and is at

risk of also being censored here on my profile.

So save this video and share it.

It's very important that you share it with as many people as possible.

Pay attention to everything this former systems programmer is going to

say about the vulnerability of electronic voting machines.

The TSE took apart a voting machine live on national TV to prove

that it is secure. I'm a programmer, and that didn't prove

anything.

I've been programming since I was twelve.

I spent my life building technology products.

I worked at Nubank, within the financial system.

If there's one thing I understand, it's how computers work.

That's why I watched that scene with unease.

They opened the machine in front of the cameras, showed the motherboard, the

media, the vote storage compartment.

As if fraud left marks on plastic.

Software fraud doesn't show up in hardware.

Showing the circuit and saying, "See? There's nothing here," is

like proving a book tells the truth by showing the quality of the

paper. And the voting machine isn't even what worries me most.

worries me most.

In the last presidential election, one hundred and twenty-four

million Brazilians voted, spread across four hundred and

seventy-two thousand polling stations.

All those votes were consolidated in a few hours,

by a single system. And the result

came out that same night. Now let me tell you something that

every programmer knows: adding votes

is code, and the command that adds is as simple as the

command that changes.

Two similar lines. One counts your vote, the

someone else changes your vote. A miscalculation, a

bug, a malicious line, and the difference disappears

inside the machine. At Nubank, I learned the number one rule of

money: absolutely everything needs to be traceable.

Every cent is checked by independent systems.

If a number doesn't add up, the system locks up and flags it.

No one asks you to trust. The system is designed so

you don't have to trust. Does a number that defines who

governs Brazil deserve less rigor than a bank transfer?

And do you know what's most outrageous?

The solution exists. You pay a fifty-real payment slip

and demand the receipt. In the vote that decides the

country, you walk away empty-handed. There is a

technology called end-to-

end verifiability. You vote and receive a cryptographic receipt.

It proves that your vote was entered into the

counting, without revealing who you voted for.

Trust is no longer a matter of faith.

Add that to a count carried out in duplicate,

triplicate, audited by independent entities,

with no connection to the government or the State.

Then no one has to trust anyone.

But the one that runs the election, counts the votes, and adjudicates

any challenges to it is the same

institution. Judge and party. And instead of building

this verification, they chose to put on a show.

Real transparency doesn't choose what to show.

It provides the means for anyone

to check for themselves. What the country witnessed was an

institution controlling the show, the script, and

the applause, and calling the spectacle an audit.

A system where the answer to every question is: trust us.

in me. You may even be right, but you'll never be able to prove it.

As long as the official answer is "trust us," the

doubt will continue to be rational.

A ten-real Pix transfer leaves more

verifiable traces than the 124 million

votes that decide our country.

Now listen to this. The TSE administration, which presided over the

2022 electoral process, with help from

China and the United States, has uncovered everything,

knows it owes us many explanations.

And sooner or later, they will pay for the fraudulent maneuvers that

put an old thief in the Presidency of the Republic and, in turn, Brazil

in the swamp we are currently living in.