Persian → English transcript

The combined capability and understanding of officials when they rent,

run the country,

These are completely influential in the decisions of even the Supreme Leader.

And let me give you an example— what a great question you asked, by the way,

let me recall something. During Martyr Raisi's time, we went to negotiate to

revive the JCPOA, But no agreement was signed. Do you know what the

reason was? Let me also tell you this honestly, I personally believed

from an expert

perspective that those negotiations were not on the right track.

But they didn't yield any results at all. A very important reason for this was that

Martyr Raisi, may he rest in peace, when you spoke logically to him,

he would accept it. National interests took precedence over political and

factional interests for him. Mr. Nabavian and one of the representatives

went to see him at that time. They said," Honorable Mr.

Raisi, this agreement that is about to be signed has these serious flaws: one, two,

three, four, five, six, seven, eight." This won't achieve the result we want.

It won't lift the sanctions or anything, Like the JCPOA, it will become a new trap.

We give some concessions at first,

they are supposed to implement it,

they don't, and they keep the country in limbo. When he, based on the text,

because he wasn't a stubborn person,

because national interests were truly important to him, realized it,

he himself no longer insisted on negotiations,

so to speak, and in that matter he said,'

Alright, if there is no agreement, so be it.' At the same time, the Americans had

started a game, meaning they had

also pulled some tricks, But I want to say,

this is the difference between one official and another.

I mean, Mr. Raisi— let's send a Salawat for the peace of his soul.

O Allah, bless Muhammad and the family of Muhammad, and hasten their relief.

You see, Mr. Raisi, may God have mercy on him, was not an extra and imposed

burden on the Supreme Leader.

Even if there was a decision in the government

that a part of the revolutionary front might criticize or find fault with,

let me tell you very honestly,

Some people criticize us now, for example,

asking why we objected to certain negotiations even during Raisi's administration.

I say," In fact, it's because we were honest. We said,' Look, negotiating

with America won't lead to any results.'"

We didn't want Raisi's administration to repeat the experience of the JCPOA.

For people to get false hope and then see nothing happened, and in the end,

prices fluctuate. Poor Mr. Raisi,

this was a very important trait of his— he didn't impose things,

and he didn't persist in doing wrong.

When he saw that something was truly a reality, he would stand by it.

But well, after all, the composition of administrations is influential.

I've said this before and I'll say it now. One example is Mr.

Raisi, and another is Mr. Hassan Rouhani.

I've said this elsewhere and I'll say it now so we can understand the differences.

Well, you remember, our martyred leader repeatedly said that if the US withdraws

from the JCPOA, we will also withdraw. He even said," If they tear up the JCPOA,

we will set it on fire." What did Rouhani say in response?

He said," Some think it's a brazier and want to burn it." He was such an abusive and

rootless person. Apart from this, you might also wonder why we didn't withdraw when

Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018. Didn't the Leader say this?

This is for your information. If I am wrong,

let the Supreme National Security Council publish a document to the contrary,

or even put me on trial over this.

Because the decision of the system and the Leader was that we must withdraw. Mr.

Rouhani arbitrarily came on camera and said," We won't withdraw,

we want to continue with the Europeans."

Look, this is the president's power in action. Especially if it's a

president who easily disregards the Leader's words, like Rouhani.

But then you have someone like Mr.

Raisi, who wasn't a burden to the Leader. In fact, he would lift a burden,

and if there was a mistake, he would go and correct it. And now, the faction in

power— again, I'm not talking about individuals— the faction in power

overall has a JCPOA- oriented outlook. Its outlook is JCPOA- oriented,

and its members are almost the same. After all, Dr.

Araghchi, Zarif's deputy foreign minister during the JCPOA,

is now the foreign minister,

and many of those who negotiated back then are negotiating now as well.