hebrew → English transcript

When Eyal Zamir took office, the plan—as defined by the Defense Minister—spoke of achieving a decisive outcome that would take up to half a year, and the next day he came to the command and told us: Friends, this is not the plan I would expect to see. I think we can do it faster, stronger, higher.

I told him it’s also a function of force levels and resources. He says: You’ll get everything—no limitations.

Suddenly you see that all the talk is different; the talk becomes not about a decisive outcome but about applying pressure to reach a deal.

Something flips: Eyal Zamir of “victory, victory, victory; decisive outcome, decisive outcome; fast, fast; 80–90 days from today” suddenly brings the political echelon a different plan. Why? Because the Military Advocate General succeeds in convincing him that it’s forbidden to move the population from the northern Strip.

And if they stayed there, then you also have to contain them there. So Nitzan Alon convinces him, and Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi convinces him, and Ghassan Alian tells him: Look, this method won’t work. No chance. It will fail.

They convince him we have to work with the UN like we used to, with the trucks, the whole system we know ends up in Hamas's hands. Enter Eyal Zamir—he's a good man; he comes with good intentions. In his first week in office, he said the words "victory" and "decisive outcome" more than I wanted in an entire term.

But in the end, it’s wrapped in a very big legal wrapper and a very big media/public one. After all, if you want Yedioth Ahronoth to write something nice about you

In short, he couldn’t take the heat.

In short, no; bottom line, yes—he couldn’t take the heat.