Discussion on Nuclear Policy and Security

If they come now, and let's assume,

with these B- 1 Lancers or any fighter jet, today, tonight, or any other night,

and target another one of our

nuclear facilities, is one response, is the response just to say," Well,

if they want to consider this as the endpoint,"

we shouldn't accept it and should continue our own operational process,

which Vahid also pointed to.

It seems our military structure has a specific goal, and regardless of the fighting,

it is doing its job.

What if we say, wouldn't it be appropriate, if they do such a thing, to declare as

a new equation that the next attack on our nuclear facilities will coincide and be

accompanied by our withdrawal from the NPT?

I think, though I didn't want to put it this way,

it still seems to me that this is the bare minimum action that can be taken.

I mean, this is in conflict with all the pillars, existence, philosophy,

and nature of that NPT organization— actually,

that NPT treaty, that treaty of nuclear non- proliferation, in conflict for this to

happen again. Well, it's highly reasonable for us to say," Look,

the least I can do under these circumstances is to pull out of the NPT for now."

You see, the reason I say we must be careful is that they say,"

Do you want to build a bomb that you want to withdraw from the nuclear treaty?"

We've said these things before, but some people just watch a 30- second clip.

Whether they want to build it or not, the country's wise minds,

both inside and outside the government, express their views,

listen, the strategy might change, or it might remain unchanged;

there have been jurisprudential reasons, political and security reasons,

all of these together.

Many variables change,

this equation itself is rewritten anew, we really don't know.

Everyone has opinions, and so do we, we might have some.

I have never, regarding what my opinion is, tried to avoid speaking,

even when it was online, for some reasons.

But now, in this regard, we are talking about a specific matter.

I say, look, the NPT at least says you have some tools for negotiation.

I will take them from you.

Fordow was active, they hit it, and now it is no longer active.

We don't care right now how much Fordow was damaged,

but there is no nuclear activity in Fordow.

At least according to what we know from appearances.

Well, look, they took a tool from you,

so you should take a tool from them too, and then go negotiate over that.

I say, even if you know in the end you want to return to the NPT, look,

I don't want to build it at all, okay, agreed, but have something

so you can say,' Well, if they give you these, which sanctions will you lift?'

Regardless of whether we become another model,

we would be the non- bomb- making model outside the NPT. Mr. Nima referred to this.

Well, look, I'm not in a position to give specific examples.

The reason is what Mr. Vahid said:

we don't have classified information.

But we have a model— look,

yesterday is now history— we have a historical model.

Six, seven, five days ago, you came and said,"

If you target my civilian infrastructure once more, what I am doing in other places,

I will extend to the UAE as well."

Now your threat is credible,

with the same credibility as if I say it's night right now,

or we say it's day tomorrow at 9: 00 a.m. It's completely credible.

They know you are capable of it, and you have the will, the courage, and the tools.

For this, too, you must have a formula.

It shouldn't be like— look,

there are things we used to say at the beginning of the war, We used to say,"

Look, if they hit a military base, for example, it makes no difference.

Is it only a crime if they hit a city,

but if they hit a military base, they have the right?" It's not like that.

Now, we shouldn't think," Well, if they hit nuclear facilities, it's fine."

They are dead wrong.

And you must set an equivalent response for it right now.

I think they will hit Mount Kolang, and I think just as hitting Fordow didn't work,

and hitting our other underground facilities didn't work,

this one is the deepest of all, so it won't work on this either,

but you must respond. This response is very important.

It's not like you can say," Well, the nuclear site is fine."

Who said the nuclear site is fine?

Whether we want to build a bomb or we don't want to build a bomb— I'm talking about

the level of sovereignty, my own opinion...

It's our own business, an internal family matter.

We decide: if we want to, we build; if not, we don't,

We might even want to build and proliferate it.

That's also our business, it's all our business, because you you said and

decided that international laws don't apply to Iranians.

From now on, we have nothing to talk about.