Hebrew → English transcript

Negotiations to release the hostages on behalf of the Mossad, after years

in a very senior role in the Mossad. Before that, for many long years

in the Shin Bet as head of the undercover operatives’ operational unit, after

a powerful career, where Ronen Bar also served as his deputy

in one of his senior positions in the Shin Bet. He speaks quite a few languages,

understands very well the language of intelligence organizations, his name is Eyal

Tzir-Cohen and this is his first television interview. Here is

the interview I held with him about an hour ago. Good evening, Eyal

Tzir-Cohen. Good evening, Ayala. How are you?

I feel excellent, thank you for inviting me. Thank you for coming,

it is an honor for us. You have held a variety of roles over your life,

in positions where you risked your life and also the lives of others, and this time

it is a different kind of challenge, a studio interview. It is a different arena.

that you are not used to. No, I am not used to it, but I

as they say, with your help I feel I am adapting great.

All right. So tell us in a few sentences, who are you?

I served for thirty-five years in the security establishment, nineteen years

In the Shin Bet, sixteen years in the Mossad. All my positions, most if not all,

were in the operational field. In the Shin Bet I served as a fighter in a

mista'arvim unit, and I also led the unit during the Second Intifada

as commander. And your deputy was Ronen Bar?

Correct, Ronen Bar was my deputy during the Second Intifada

for two years. Even though he is not from this unit,

right?

Right, he is not from the unit, he did not grow up as a… let's call

it an Arabist, I did, and anyway he… And in the Mossad?

In the Mossad I did a variety of roles, division head, deputy

department head, I held two department head positions, head of the Africa

Department and head of the Tevel Department. Altogether I was something like eight years a

department head and I was discharged a year ago, in 2024. And you were the head of the

negotiating team for the release of the hostages. Correct, correct. From the moment that the seventh

of October happened, I actually led the negotiating team,

through the release of the first two female hostages, Natalie and Yehudit

Raanan. The American ones. Correct, who were released in mid October,

on October 20, on Friday if I am not mistaken. And every

The November round, when about one hundred ten hostages, women and children, were released,

that was all under my leadership, and I know that on the screen people see

some of the images from that round, which really feels like a distant memory,

but… until the change of the American administration. Right, I

actually finished my role when the elections in the United States

were held and Trump won the elections. So I will really talk

with you about Qatar and Hamas and about how this event was managed.

With the Biden administration, regarding the hostage deals, there was one image

and in practice it was something else?

What was going on there behind the scenes?

Right, so I know the Biden administration accompanied the negotiations

in a very significant way in ’24, from the moment that, let’s call it,

the first round collapsed. I think that in the public there was

a lack of factual basis to be able to assess and really understand

to what extent, in the end, the involvement of the Biden administration,

and of the actors that it ultimately sent on its behalf, Tony

Blinken, Jake Sullivan, to what extent their contribution was

not constructive to the negotiations. Not constructive?

Not constructive. In fact, I’m saying, we were

sitting… did they torpedo the negotiations?

I don’t think they torpedoed them, but I think that their policy

around March–April, with their focus on Biden’s

election campaign, with the understanding

that there are internal political elements in the United States that look

at them unfavorably, had a very significant impact. We did

not really see pressure, not on the mediators, not on Hamas

itself, and in fact most of the pressure we saw from the Biden administration,

I think we mainly saw it on the Israeli government. The

expression of these things was mainly in the intention to come and say

that, for example, the most significant levers for the negotiations at the time

when it was critical were denied to us. The issues of humanitarian

aid, the issue of using munitions in a slightly more

free manner. Did they stop supplying us munitions?

Certainly. There were very significant restrictions on the use

of munitions, and also on entering additional areas,

including Rafah. There were many reservations from the administration.

the American one on this. That made me a bit sad because alongside

the sympathy and empathy they showed, in a very very

demonstrative way, toward the families of the hostages… outwardly.

Outwardly. Was there a situation where a full deal could have been made

during that period, speaking of all this talk?

No. There was not. We were not close to a deal during the year

’24, until the administration changed. There were ups and downs, there was

a sense of progress, and what is called one step forward two

steps back, there was not, we were not a hair’s breadth away as it was

in some of the things in the media, it was not that we were close to a deal.

So who briefed all those briefings?

The reporters did not make it up, who briefed all those briefings?

Look, this has to be said honestly, Ayala, the public in the end

and also the media, they lack the factual basis, they lack

the place of all the foundations that, in the end, all the complexities,

all the forces at play. And I think that many times, both

in the media and in the families and in the public, they clung to certain assumptions

that it seemed that if only this were solved, then everything would be solved, without

understanding that there is a whole camel train of problems bound up with every single thing.

Did the government oppose the release of hostages?

No, never. No, I never felt that the government,

I think it is completely clear, that all along I felt

that the government wanted a deal, it wanted a good deal. It

wanted a good deal, a deal that in the end has strategic

significance, and the government is responsible for this matter. The

final deal that Trump was here in the country for, was that a good deal?

It was a significant deal, I say that very clearly,

significantly better than any deal that was proposed during ’24,

including what they call the Biden deal that was in May ’24

and so on. I always thought that a good deal is a deal, and that is

also what I told the negotiating team, it is a deal in which the hostages,

the first hostage who is released has the same chance as the

last hostage. And the last hostage has the same chance as the

first. Right, you are correct, right. We are hearing a lot

About the army, what malfunctions happened in the army, we do not hear

About the Shin Bet, almost nothing. What happened on October seventh?

How is it possible that the Shin Bet of the State of Israel did not have

even one source in Gaza on October seventh who would pick up the phone and say

before October seventh, “Guys, they are planning a massive deception

against you here. Get ready.” How does that happen?

First of all, Ayala, I need to say, I was not a partner

to the internal investigations in the Shin Bet, most of them took place during

the last year, a year in which I also did not serve. But when I

look at this thing, it is clear there was a very significant

failure here. To reach a conclusion or an answer to the question

you are asking, you really have to sit down and receive the factual basis,

analyze its implications, and reach conclusions. You said

a lot of beautiful words. You understand the field, you are an intelligence

man, you know the Shin Bet, you know the Mossad,

you know Hamas, you were an undercover operative inside Gaza. What happened here?

I think—I will say this—I think that a reality in which

There was no HUMINT report, and in the end the SIGINT network

ultimately did not allow the warning to be provided, that is a

very significant failure.

But what really troubles me, Ayala, as someone who in the end

heard about the investigations, is that there is a certain scent

of hiding behind the political apron. As if in the end,

if only the policy had allowed us or had been right, then in

the end the service would have fulfilled its mission.

I think you and I want to live in a country where

the intelligence services and those who head them know that they

must warn, thwart, provide insights under any policy,

no matter what it is. And not hide. And not hide, not come

and say, “We warned, we said.” That is not…

It is not relevant. No, if we warned, then we were obligated

to prepare. That also works against them overall. Certainly. If

we warned, then we were obligated to prepare, so our situation is

even worse. I agree. This argument is, in my view, an almost

childish argument. Right. The hiding

Behind the diplomatic apron… tell us something about Ronen.

Bar, you know him. I know him, I think he is

a talented man and so on, but he failed on that day. The reasons

why he failed are kept with him. I can also say

one more thing, and I think it is true not only for Ronen

Bar, but also for other heads of the service who preceded him. The Mossad

for years wanted a hand and a foot and understood that the campaign with Hamas

is an international campaign and in the end it is not only relevant

to the West Bank and to Gaza. And there were periods, also in 2016 when I was

head of the Counterterrorism Division, when we very, very much wanted to be

involved in what was happening in Gaza. And the Shin Bet refused, I know

the… the Shin Bet refused, and I say that is right, and I said

this, just as Rabin once said that we have an illness called

“It will be fine,” when an intelligence organization tells you “we’re

on it,” then you understand they are not on it and that there is a problem.

Speaking of a Mossad chief, what do you think of the appointment of Roman Gofman?

First of all, I wish him a great deal of success and I am convinced

that he understands the challenge he is facing. I think

that in recent years we have been witnessing that the world of secrecy,

of espionage, of counter-espionage, the technological world

that is involved in it, has risen, its complexity has increased in an exponential way.

I think I would even say that this world of managing

such organizations is a profession. A bit like medicine or

engineering or like other very significant professional fields.

In the end you need a very deep understanding because every day

in these organizations hundreds of events take place. Could

it be that he does not have that element?

That is… I think he will need to recruit the knowledge around him

in order, in the end, to know how to make the right decisions. Are you still connected

over there?

Are you hearing about a wave of resignations?

Or is that… no, I am not. I am not and I also do not deal

with that, but you have to understand that a Mossad chief does not deal with things

outside the atmosphere, he deals with very tangible issues,

he deals with a great many details. And he is required to make decisions about them

Decisions. He is not a statesman, by the way. At the end of the day

he is a man whose profession is security, intelligence, and espionage, and he

needs to understand this profession, and all the disciplines within

this profession. And that is not easy. It is very, very…

Meaning he can be very talented, very combative,

very sophisticated, very cunning, but he still needs

worlds of knowledge that relate to this organization. Very true.

I am saying that today it is as if a situation has been created where you have to say

something bad about someone if he is not suited to the job. And I,

that is the last thing I will say. Iran is very dangerous for us

still?

Very. Very dangerous, very dangerous. I think that in general,

all our rivals, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, right now have

one strategy. They want to keep Israel at a level of

dissatisfaction that is bearable. Dissatisfaction, because they

want to act against us. Bearable, because they do not want us

to rise up against them right now. They want time. The element of time

is an important element. They want to gain time, to return,

To recover, to kind of, as they say, let us crawl back

to where they were. Clearly. To lull us back to sleep and deceive

us again. So while we are busy with internal fights,

they will already be planning the next thing. Right. We must not agree

to this, we must not agree to this feeling of bearable

dissatisfaction. We must not go back to a policy of containment,

to a policy of not holding territory, a policy that is not

aggressive enough, a policy that does not restrain the mediators who are

constantly, as they say, trying to arrange things. And also not

to give in to international pressure, because in the end, if not,

we are bound to return to the same point. Terrible. How can it be

that the same country with the same intelligence agencies, with the same

security forces, was there both on October 7 and in the two years

after that, in which there were phenomenal successes. This is something that

does not fit with logic and with common sense. I agree.

I agree. And sometimes it depends on the heads of the organizations. The investigations

We need to give an answer to this question. I’m glad, by the way, that we saw

what we might call, in the rebirth of the state and of the nation, like, of course,

our rapid recovery, all of us. But it is a failure that will be

hard for us, in the end, to erase. You were also a candidate to head the

Shin Bet as well. How is Zini, in your opinion?

Honestly, I didn’t know him before his name came up. He is

definitely a good man, a brave fighter, with a background… really, the salt

of the earth and all that. Does he have the abilities and the knowledge required

to run an organization in the situation it is in?

Time will tell. For now, that is his challenge and he will do his utmost

to meet it. Let’s hope for the best. Are they setting him up to fail there?

I do not think so. I am glad to hear that. I do not think so. His good

is the good of all of us. I hope that people will rise

above the hatreds and love the country more than they hate

the other. Thank you very much, Ayala. Thank you for inviting me.

Thank you very much.