Analysis of Yemen Negotiations and Regional Impact

It is hitting Eilat,

but whether, ultimately,

it wants to hit a maritime target,

and how delayed it will be, we'll see in the hours ahead.

Now, the voices...

Today is the day we mentioned in last night's program,

for a plan to come forward.

Israel's Channel 13 had also reported

that for a very short period of time,

for example, a short period of time,

a corridor would open.

With the Pakistani side,

Pakistan being the main mediator of the negotiations

we've had with the American side,

negotiations are certainly being conducted as deterrence channels.

A question is raised here:

Is this the right time

for us to advance the cessation and ceasefire negotiations,

or is a plan actually unfolding in this manner

where we are advancing negotiations from that side?

Meaning, they are also entering.

How do you analyze this?

Its aspects could be, meaning it could be

disadvantageous, or it could be advantageous.

We really have to see what is happening in the negotiations.

That we now come and take a middle ground

and solve it in a way that we are close

and you also benefit,

and we also benefit. Well, is that bad?

Then we won't be empty-handed. Yemen's entry

now, our hands in operations and in

influencing global markets...

Look, Yemen's entry

can give us a free hand

and it can

be from another side, meaning entering the

negotiations themselves. Now, regarding

Yemen, we must also have a clause in the negotiations.

This is also another discussion, just as in the previous round of

negotiations, we spoke about Lebanon.

Ultimately, despite the Israeli army,

it didn't retreat, but the conditions

were almost ceasefire conditions,

a cessation of fire occurred.

A retreat did not occur,

which is very disadvantageous,

but Hezbollah forces themselves

with this development,

of having a ceasefire,

with this ceasefire part of it,

are satisfied. Let this point be clear.

But the issue wasn't fully resolved, after all.

Let's not forget this.

Regarding Yemen, if such a thing

were to enter the negotiations, for instance...

It didn't turn out like the Hezbollah experience.

Meaning, completely...

to happen. I mean, can we even think about this now,

that by the same logic we mentioned before, our stature in the region has grown,

our position has changed,

our standing and that of our allies in the region has changed.

If in the first round of the four-day war,

we forged a specific relationship with Lebanon's Hezbollah, the zealous and proud Hezbollah,

and established it,

this round is the round where we must be able to get Yemen out of

the grip of Saudi Arabia's siege.

Because here, our game is with Saudi Arabia, you see.

And of course, with Pakistan's mediation,

which, well, after all,

the relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has also become closer.

We have two minutes left of this.

Of course, regarding Yemen, there is also a point,

and that is,

we want to negotiate.

There is no reason for the clashes in Yemen to have stopped,

because our negotiations haven't started yet,

no agreement has been reached yet.

Therefore, we can use that point for it.

There was a minor issue in our conflict with Saudi Arabia:

Why don't we strike Saudi bases?

Why don't we do this or that?

If, by any chance, Saudi Arabia

wants to clash with Ansar Allah and Yemen,

the Yemenis might be able to handle it.

There might be no need at all for

Iran to intervene in this matter.

But the outcome is the same, it makes no difference.

You want to stop exports from Yanbu.

What difference does it make who

is enforcing this there?

The important thing is to get the result.

This is a very important card we want,

which benefits both Iran and Yemen.

It will certainly put pressure on Saudi Arabia and the US.

And I hope that

the officials who are discussing this

will safeguard them.

There are serious power cards right now.

Let's not play them too early.

And let's not waste them.

Yemen...

Meaning, if we wanted to talk

about the Strait of Hormuz,

they should safeguard them.

Parameters have changed again.

At least two things:

First, Yemen's entry,

which could even be

a very new development on a global scale.

To affect the Suez Canal

and create...

...other possible requests.

I said myself, I don't know if it will be applied or not.

It might take a few days, but if it works out...

Second, America came once,

struck, and couldn't reopen it.

Naturally, we shouldn't, even if

in the previous round of negotiations

we were at this point.

When they came for another round, wanting

to apply military pressure

to reach their goal and failed—

No, no, they didn't reach their goal.

The fact that we dealt some blows

which tied their hands in some areas...

They say this Kuwait incident

was truly a vital and important event.

Therefore, more serious concessions can

be obtained,

which also have

more important economic impacts.

In future negotiations, perhaps

our hands should be free for other issues as well.

And in short, this is not a situation

where we should

not negotiate now,

or quickly wrap things up

making them think we are in a rush.

Yes, meaning exactly where we can

exercise a little composure.

Let's wait and see the field performance of the Yemeni guys, Ansarullah,

to see what happens.

This can really affect our situation,

provided that Ansarullah...

does a lot more.