Account of an Israeli Intelligence Meeting on the Houthi Threat

At the end of December 2019 I traveled on behalf of the UN Human Rights Council to Jordan to take a course organized by the UN DSS Security Section And of course, during my visit to Jordan I met Israeli intelligence officer Shaul Gad,

Then he asked me more pointedly about an issue that was, well, important namely, how much of a threat the Houthis posed to Israel, and he said that within Israel, people were divided and had differing views on the matter.

Some of them didn't think Ansar Allah posed a threat to Israel compared, for example, with Hezbollah or Iran, or others, while others thought that Ansar Allah was more dangerous, and that he personally agreed with the second view,

meaning that Ansar Allah was more dangerous.

Personally, I replied to him that Ansar Allah's hostility toward Israelis and Jews is fundamental, rooted in their religion and the heart of their doctrine, and that it isn't just a political issue or something they're trying to use to win over the Yemeni public or for domestic consumption,

nor is it even, well, a temporary hostility Just as it was, for example, an issue for people like Saddam Hussein or Gaddafi or even Osama bin Laden Of course, and I told him that Israel would be the biggest loser in this matter since America, for example, is very, very far away and can distance itself at any moment from any conflict

if an agreement is reached, for example between Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia, and others.

In the discussion that also took place between me and Saul, Saul told me that they had many studies and opinions on a solution to the growing capabilities of the Houthis in Yemen, and among the options they were studying and considering was striking the Grand Mosque in Mecca or somewhere near one of the two holy mosques,

with the strike coming, for example, from the Red Sea or from somewhere else that would prove the strike came from Yemen, and, of course, pinning the blame on the Houthis in this way, accompanied by a huge media uproar and widespread campaigns inciting people against Arabs and, of course, the jihadists who

flocked to Yemen from various places. I remember replying to him and saying, “This is a dangerous scenario.

And the region is important to the whole world, I mean, jihadists, Ansar Allah, the Red Sea, and other issues, and so on.”

He replied, “No, the Red Sea— we’re its international security.

It will be secured internationally, and the Americans will secure the oil sources, and let the Saudis, the Houthis, and the jihadists drown in the desert.

And we’ll stand by and watch.” At the end of the meeting, Shaul asked me for a proposal or any opinion, on the Houthis and their threats and other matters in Yemen.

How could this issue be dealt with? So I said I’d write to him, and told him, “What if I write you a plan on this issue?”

And I did prepare this plan. The plan was based on the idea that Israel is a target for Ansar Allah, whose strength was— whose power was growing internally and regionally, day by day, and that, of course, their hostility toward Israel is a principled stance,

not merely a temporary tactic. The plan also acknowledged the failure of the idea of carrying out military operations against Ansar Allah to weaken them, Not to mention, it means they would be defeated.

So the plan proposed a simple, old concept based on the idea of striking from within with the aim of weakening and dispersing them, meaning the plan had realistic goals, not just not fantastical goals, like the goals, for example,

that the Saudis and their allies set when they began military operations against Ansar Allah in Yemen, when they spoke, for instance, of eliminating the movement within weeks.

Of course, the plan began and was based on certain considerations, one of the most important being that military campaigns against Ansar Allah had made them stronger rather than weaker, and that any new aggression against Ansar Allah would make them stronger,

and that if Israel were to attack Ansar Allah, it would make them not just local heroes, but regional heroes, and that Ansar Allah's hostility toward Israel and the Jews is principled and at the very core of their beliefs,

not merely a political issue or a matter of winning over the public or domestic consumption.

And their hostility isn't temporary, like it was with Saddam Hussein, for example, and Muammar Gaddafi and Osama bin Laden.

In this case, too, the biggest loser will be Israel, given America's distance from the region, which allows it to keep its distance because of that distance from the conflict, especially if any agreement is reached between Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia.