Critique of COVID-19 Modeling and Response
Most people who use mathematical models did not understand that this
is so limited in terms of its ability to tell us something.
They thought that that was hardcore science
and they need to take it for granted
that this is what it is and
it's certain, and that was very far from reality.
There was no understanding that this was just very tentative, very
sketchy, very speculative.
Not only they were taken for serious, which was ridiculous,
honestly, because a model is just a model.
It's not hard facts. It's not data.
But it's also that apparently nothing was learned,
even though they had been wrong several times again in the
past and just a few years before, actually.
Nobody apparently remembered that.
This is an infection that in the majority of people,
they get no symptoms or very minor symptoms.
They don't even ask about what do I have.
The number of people infected was much larger compared
to the number of documented cases.
That meant also that the risk of dying if you get infected
or similarly the risk of getting serious complications is
much lower compared to the original anticipation.
For example, the World Health Organization had
estimated a case
fatality rate of 3.4%.
Globally,
about 3.4% of reported
COVID-19 cases have died.
This means one out of 30 people who get infected dies, and that's
completely out of range compared to the reality that we
could see in these seroprevalence studies.
It was a very different picture compared to what the original
perception based on China would look like.
What happened to you then?
There was a very, very aggressive response,
mostly from media and social media and
influencers, some of them scientists who turned
themselves to
influencers.
As a scientist, I found myself immersed into a situation
that I was
totally unprepared. But it was all that wave
of heroizing and demonizing.
I think both of that was incorrect. It was just scientific work.
It was not more than that.
First
of
all, we looked at the model and
we didn't think it seemed very realistic.
So we didn't really believe in it from very early on.
According to that model, we should have had like almost 100,000
cases during the first
spring.
And after the first spring in Sweden, we had about 3,000 cases.
So that's
how wrong the model ended up. We didn't have a pandemic plan on national
level and
all the regions also had pandemic plans and those were followed.
We also
tried to find data on lockdowns and the possible effects of those.
And there's very little, if any, data on that.
It's also incredibly difficult to have a
lockdown on a modern open society, especially a
society in Sweden where we interact all the time and
it's completely necessary to keep our society running.
So the whole concept of trying to lockdown,
we never felt it was feasible. We saw so many problems with
lockdowns and as I said, very few benefits.
Can we take Sweden just like as a control group?
We could. And when you look at the whole pandemic,
like four years from the beginning in 2020 or late
2019,
Sweden did better than any other country.
While in other countries that took very serious measures,
including unfortunately the US,
we had much higher excess deaths. When you look up to
2024, Sweden is by far the best compared to any
other
country in the world.
One big difference with the swine flu time
is that at the time, the real experts
were taken for serious.
I was not the only one interviewing people like Tom
Jefferson, Carl Hennigan, Wolfgang
Wodark. They were all still considered
experts. And then when the COVID era started, started
stoning of scientists, especially those that were the real
experts. They became radioactive.
Nobody could even mention them. Nobody could interview
them.
As an epidemiologist, I could not change the tide of what
was happening.
I should have been able to change the tide.
Many other epidemiologists feel equally frustrated.
They feel that
as scientists, we knew that things were wrong.
We just couldn't change them. Other experts or quote-unquote experts
were very powerful, were lobbying, were connected to policy cycles.
And
even though they had no clue about epidemiology, they
were just running the show
along with media and influencers.
I do worry about how this whole thing was completely
derailed. And very little epidemiology, very little science
went into decision-making eventually.
End of transcript · 756 words