Investigating Foreign Election Interference
Here in Europe, there's quite an obsession with, uh,
so-called
Russian interference in elections. No evidence.
Alleged interference. No evidence is ever, uh, given for this
alleged, uh, interference. Uh, the French government established,
uh, an authority, a group, to monitor foreign influence
and, uh, uh, operations on social media, et cetera, to
manipulate opinion, uh, around the world when it comes
to elections. Now, what they found was interference
by an Israeli company, a private Israeli company.
Now, this French group, which was established to track down this type of
influence,
is called Vigenum. Now, their boss has made it very
clear what they found, and named the company Blackcore.
Vigenum's investigations have made it possible to geographically locate the
foreign
operator behind this malicious activity, a suspected Israeli company known
as Blackcore.
Its techniques were not limited to municipal elections in France.
They also appear to have been used to conduct foreign digital interference
operations in various countries and regions, such as Angola, Togo, the
elections in Scotland, and also the 2025 New York City mayoral
election.
Now, in Scotland, the campaign targeted John Swinney,
the head of the Scottish National Party, a pro-Palestinian,
pro-Scottish independence party.
Now, Vigenum, uh, identified two hundred and
fifty-six different accounts that were posting
anti-Swinney comments, uh, and operating a real
coordinated attempt to discredit him.
Uh, they went into some detail about what they
found. Here it is.
Vigenum identified an Israeli company operating in the field of influence
called Blackcore. Investigations conducted into this company
revealed digital infrastructure linked to this pseudo enterprise offering
services meant for the artificial amplification of online content and the
conduct of false information operations.
However, this entity appears to be part of an
ecosystem composed of
numerous Israeli cybersecurity companies.
While it didn't actually name who was behind the
commissioning of Blackcore, it did ask some questions
of the Israeli government.
As soon as the intelligence services saw that these interferences
originating from Israeli soil were occurring during the municipal
elections,
it goes without saying that we did indeed request explanations
and also
assistance. It could have been a private group in
Israel that has escaped the
vigilance or control of the Israeli government or state authorities.
Now, unsurprisingly, uh, Blackcore, uh,
has seemingly disappeared from the internet.
Uh, no trace can be found now, uh, that, uh, uncomfortable
questions are being asked, uh, by the French to the Israeli embassy.
They've disappeared. Somebody else that was asking questions was the
national newspaper who broke the story in the UK.
They've been asking the British, uh, state, the British government, uh,
for more
information about what they knew, uh, about this apparent
influence operation from a company based in Israel.
And again, very strange, but predictable silence from the
British. And speaking about it being back in
Britain, you have to
ask yourself, uh, why the same scrutiny has never been
applied to these
allegations of Russian interference where no evidence has ever
been found. Take Romania, for example, where the actual
election was annulled,
canceled, overruled on the basis of alleged
Russian disinformation campaigns.
I myself, uh, was detained, taken from an aircraft by
six armed police officers, detained, questioned, and
deported for the country for allegedly trying to influence the,
the elections because I was traveling, uh, on behalf of Russia today.
I arrived in, um, uh, Romania in Bucharest from
Dublin within the EU.
Um, and when I touched down in Bucharest,
a group of police officers, uh, before anyone was allowed to leave the
plane, uh, so I was taken down the, uh, steps of the
aircraft with all the passengers, uh, you know, watching,
uh, in amazement. I was asked questions in the vehicle by some
of the officers where, who I wa- where I was going, who I was, uh, going to
meet. I explained to them I was a journalist.
I was there to cover the elections.
I was presented with a document which
obviously was prepared. It was stamped presumably by a judge.
They wouldn't let me have a copy of it.
They wouldn't let me take a photograph of it.
Uh, and it s- said that I was a threat to
the security of the state, and on that basis, they were
deporting me from Romania. Talking about a lack of evidence when it
came to the Romanian election and its overruling, at least
in the UK, some people were still asking in the aftermath
of this debacle, a very serious, uh, security threat to British
democracy, uh, some people were, as I say, asking questions
about what the security state in the UK actually
knew about what had happened in the Scottish Parliament.
I have shared this with First Minister, anticipating that he will want to
understand more about this report and what actions remedial and future
or proactive are being taken.
So the question isn't whether, uh, there was interference in the
Scottish elections, French elections, and others.
Uh, the question is, what will those in power in the
UK reveal? They knew about an operation based, uh,
and coming from a, an Israeli private company, uh,
what they knew about what was happening.
You have to ask yourself, it seems that there seems to be a
complicity around this type of interference.
Now, when it comes to Russia allegedly
interfering
in foreign elections, no proof again, uh, there doesn't seem to
need to be any proof. Even mentioning the word Russia
and election in the same
sentence seems to be enough to get an election overruled in an
EU country like Romania. When it comes to the UK,
asking what was known about the evidenced
implication of an Israeli private company manipulating
online opinion about a senior politician seems to be a
no-no also. Make of that
as you will.
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