Analysis of NATO Expansion and Russia

On Russia,

this is a, this is a terribly

sad,

uh, thing for me 'cause I spent a lot of time

in the '80s and early '90s on Russia. I'd go there every year.

I'd spend weeks there. I traveled all over.

I got to know most of the people who ran the government and who are

now there.

And, um,

I think that

right now we're confronted with something that potentially could've been avoided,

and the fundamental blunder that the

United States made

in, um,

the, uh,

mid-'80s, late, late '80s, early '90s,

was the expansion of NATO.

I mean, uh, here we'd won the Cold War.

We'd won the Cold War.

And you, um,

then had people saying, "Well, now what are we gonna do with NATO?"

Oh, well, I don't know. It's a bureaucracy. It works. What

are we gonna do with it?

And so then the idea of expanding NATO.

And the problem with it is the, is this.

During the negotiation for the reunification of Germany,

Gorbachev and Jim Baker, Jim Baker says to Gorbachev...

You know, in the treaty it says, you know, no NATO troops in what was then East

Germany. In the discussions, and I had this conversation with Gorbachev

last summer, he told me very directly

the conversation with Jim Baker. The question was

Baker saying, "NATO, if you agree to reunification of Germany

in

NATO,

uh, no expand... N-NATO will not expand one inch further

east," which

is what I went to see Gorbachev to confirm 'cause I care so much about this.

Is this true?

Now the interpretation on the American side, Scowcroft says, "Well, he

misinterpreted."

Baker I ca- haven't quite pinned down.

But Gorbachev says very specifically, he, he said, "If you

expand one inch further e... If you allow reunification Germany and

NATO,

NATO will not expand one inch further east." And then Gorbachev told me

Kohl told him the same thing, which was new information,

right?

So the first Bush

keeps his promise.

Assume it's a promise.

They talk about partnership for peace and, you know, Russians kinda like that

idea.

And then Clinton comes in.

What's the early thing he does in his first term?

He expands NATO.

Why expand NATO?

And I read the, and I've been rereading 'cause I've been

thinking of writing

something about this, Strobe Talbott's article in Foreign

Affairs about why

expand NATO. And you read it and you say,

"Huh? That's a reason?"

You know?

And last summer again, I'm talking to a number of people

that I've known for many years,

two

guys who ran for president in Russia in 1996 and 2000.

And, um,

you know, one of them says to me, "I'm out campaigning in the Urals.

Somebody comes up to me and says," this is '96, "Why, why are the

Americans expanding NATO? Isn't that a military alliance?"

And they said, "Well, yeah, but it's, it's a military alliance."

And the guy said,

the politician said, "Russians might not be able to st-

understand puts and calls,

but they certainly understand tanks."

Right?

And think of it this way.

What would any Politics 101?

Somebody who's a friend, supporter goes

bankrupt. What do you do?

You call him up on the phone and say, "You know, Joe, it's tough.

I know y- things are gonna be okay. You're gonna be back."

You know, you show him some respect.

And what did we do?

We kicked them when they were down. We expanded NATO.

And in expanding NATO created the

issue that allows the

authoritarianism that has returned

to say it was justified.

And I think that it was a blunder of monumental

proportions. When I was at Oxford, I spent a lot of time on the origins of

the

Cold War, and you know, I read all these documents and, I mean,

the,

all of the documents,

and it's, uh, you know, the Russians were responsible basically.

You know? Here

it's, uh, unfortunate. It's a blunder of vision.

And in the best of circumstances, it was bureaucratic inertia in

NATO that people had to have a job. In the worst of circumstances,

it was a self-fulfilling prophecy with certain people in the Clinton

administration

who irri- who were irredentist East European, uh,

uh, types who believe Russia will forever be

the enemy, and therefore we

gotta protect against the time where they might once again be aggressive,

thereby creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

So

what do you do with it now?

Still have a, still talk.

But if we had done that,

and if we'd really done a strategic partnership talking about common threats

over

the long term and what we can do together,

because we knew ultimately Russia would be back, I mean, they did have oil even

then.

Um,

you know, imagine how Iran would be different today.

Imagine how Central Asia would be different,

you know?

So you've got me at a kind of moment where

my feelings about the Russian thing are extremely

sad because

I d- I think that we've created a problem

that could've been easily

avoided, and we, we've lost a partner that

could've been enormously important over the long term, and in

particular,

uh, you know,

with regard to the issues that most threaten us

today.