Analysis of Saudi-Israeli Relations and Houthi Threats

It is the Zionist Jewish enemy.

The Sayyid Leader’s recent positions preoccupy Israeli enemy circles.

The analysis is fraught with concern over talk of Saudi cooperation

with Israel, before noting his confirmation that the real danger to

holy sites is the Zionist threat.

Ibn Salman cannot offer a solution, and it does not seem that the fighting between the two sides

is nearing its end. In any case, the Houthi leader delivered

a speech and raised a very provocative issue regarding what he says about

military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, at least during the recent

period. These are his statements.

The Saudi has not left us alone.

He initiates aggression against us.

He was intercepting

even drones so they would not reach

occupied Palestine against the Israeli enemy.

He was opening his airports to Israeli

reconnaissance aircraft to spy on us at close range.

He was even sharing intelligence information with the Israeli enemy.

We hear the Houthi leader saying that the real threat to

The threat to the holy sites comes from Israel, and they

are ready to work within an Islamic coalition against Israel.

That is, the Houthis threaten not only Saudi Arabia but also

Israel.

It is clear in its hostility toward all Islamic holy sites and

in targeting them.

It is the Jewish Zionist enemy.

In explaining the Saudi setback, the Zionist analysis attributed

part of the failure to a miscalculation regarding Sana'a and

the resources it possesses for a long-term confrontation, which puts

Riyadh, from the perspective of Zionist analysts, in a predicament open to several

possibilities.

Part of the difficulty is that the Houthis have institutions and a

complete state apparatus, infrastructure, and an

economic system they know how to direct well, and this

constitutes a very great difficulty.

Saudi hostility.

The Saudis have become desperate that the United States

might help them, and they turned to the Houthis themselves

through Oman to mediate. Trump has already made clear

to the Saudis that he has no intention of intervening in this

The war. He is prepared to provide weapons and financial aid,

but he will not wage a ground war against the Houthis.

Therefore, I think the Saudis have begun to understand that their situation is extremely

dire.

As for the balance of power, enemy circles view the Bab

al-Mandab as a strategic gain for Sana'a against Riyadh

and Washington, not a fleeting field gain. This is accompanied by

Zionist talk that Sana'a is acting according to its own

interests, even if they align with Tehran's.

They also understand that the Houthis reached the Bab al-Mandab Strait

to stay, and they have no intention of withdrawing from there.

They now hold a very powerful bargaining chip,

whether against President Trump or Saudi Arabia, because there is no one

who will fight and drive them out of there.

We know this is not a matter of a classic proxy, and the Houthis

always maintain their independence despite their partnership with Iran, and they

have acted within the Saudi context, primarily based on their own interests.

Thus, the Zionist assessment shifts from Riyadh's predicament and its relations

security, to changes in the balance of power and the nature of Yemeni decision-making

In a scene whose repercussions extend from Saudi Arabia and Bab al-Mandab

to the calculations of the temporary enemy entity.